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We examine the extent to which markets enable the provision of housing finance across a wide 
range of countries. Housing is a major purchase requiring long-term financing, and the factors 
that are associated with well functioning housing finance systems  are those that enable the 
provision of long-term finance. Across all countries, controlling for country size, we find that 
countries with stronger legal rights for borrowers and lenders (through collateral and bankruptcy 
laws), deeper credit information systems, and a more stable macroeconomic environment have 
deeper housing finance systems. These same factors also help explain the variation in housing 
finance across emerging market economies. Across developed countries, which tend to have low 
macroeconomic volatility and relatively extensive credit information systems, variation in the 
strength of legal rights helps explain the extent of housing finance. We also examine another 
potential factor—the existence of sizeable government securities markets—that might enable the 
development of emerging markets’ housing finance systems, but we find no evidence supporting 
that. 
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any way. 1. Introduction 
  Housing is for many households around the world both the largest expense and the most 
important asset. For all households it is an important determinant of quality of life. For the 
majority in developed countries, and for some in emerging market economies, housing is 
adequate.  But a significant proportion of the world’s population does not have access to 
adequate and affordable housing.  According to UN-Habitat (2005), roughly one billion people, 
or one-third of the world’s urban population, live in slums. And a well-functioning housing 
market influences not only shelter concerns.  At a basic level, a country’s housing sector can help 
to improve public health (by reducing the likelihood of outbreaks of disease) and stimulate 
economic growth (through its own job creation, but also as workplaces for home-based 
entrepreneurs).  The best housing sectors should enable the adequate provision of shelter across 
all segments of the population.   
In this paper we focus on one important pillar of a well-functioning housing market, the 
extent that markets enable the provision of housing finance.  While there are many aspects to the 
housing market (discussed below), it can be argued that the provision of housing finance is a 
binding constraint that must be addressed before the market can sustainably provide adequate 
housing. Even in the best of environments, housing is a major purchase—average home prices 
typically ranging from 4 times annual income in developed countries to 8 times annual income in 
emerging economies (Ball, 2003)—that is affordable only when payments can be spread out over 
time. Absent a well-functioning housing finance system, for many the market-based provision of 
formal housing will be neither adequate nor affordable.
1 Other housing or housing finance 
                                                      
1  In addition to the availability of housing finance, other factors that impact housing affordability include home 
prices and household incomes. 
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 solutions are possible—such as subsidies and the outright provision of public housing—but these 
can be unsustainable (Quigley, 2000).
2
While housing finance is a vital component of a well-functioning housing system, to date 
there has not been a systematic analysis of the depth of housing finance across a broad set of 
countries.
3  In fact, as far as we know, no formal cross-country study of the size of the housing 
finance market exists.  Existing international housing finance studies tend to be descriptive and 
highly informative, but lack any formal empirical analysis and often focus on one or more 
country case studies.  The seminal work is Boleat (1985), which includes numerous country case 
studies. Diamond and Lea (1992) evaluate the housing finance systems of five countries. 
Chiquier, Hassler, and Lea (2004) include case studies of eight emerging market economies. 
Low, Sebag-Montefiore, and Dübel (2003), the Mercer Oliver Wyman study, focus on eight 
countries in Europe. Hegedüs and Struyk (2005) present case studies on seven transition 
economies and Germany and tabulate housing finance statistics. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) 
analyze 14 developed countries (with an emphasis on loan-to-value ratios). Allen, Chui, and 
Maddaloni (2004) include a short section on mortgage markets in 17 developed countries. 
Renaud (2005) includes a presentation of data on 45 countries, the broadest set of countries 
heretofore available.  All of these studies are important, but none formally studies why some 
countries have larger mortgage markets than others and none includes formal empirical analysis.
4
We begin to fill this void by analyzing the determinants of the extent of housing finance 
in a sample of 61 countries that includes both developed countries and a wide range of emerging 
                                                      
2 In general, an argument for the government as a direct provider of housing has been that the free market is unable 
to provide housing for the lower income households. 
3 Data limitations preclude a broad comparative study of other measures (such as reach) of the efficacy of the 
housing finance systems. 
4  Other studies include OECD (2002) on transition economies and BIS (2006a) on 14 developed countries and two 
emerging markets. In addition, Ghosh (2006) includes a description of mortgage finance in East Asia, Watanabe 
(1998) includes eight case studies of Asian housing finance systems, and the September 2005 special issue of 
Journal of Housing Economics includes a number of case studies (see Sanders (2005) and references therein). 
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 economies.  Across all countries, controlling for country size, we find that countries with 
stronger legal rights for borrowers and lenders (through collateral and bankruptcy laws), deeper 
credit information systems, and a more stable macroeconomic environment have deeper housing 
finance systems.  These same factors also help explain the variation in housing finance across 
emerging market economies. Across developed countries, which tend to have low 
macroeconomic volatility and relatively extensive credit information systems, we find that 
variation in the strength of legal rights helps explain the extent of housing finance. 
We note at the outset two things that we do not address in this paper.  First, housing 
finance, while vital, is but one of many aspects of the overall housing market.  The availability of 
housing is governed by supply and demand factors.  According to World Bank (1993), across 
countries, housing supply tends to be idiosyncratic, primarily because of the housing sector’s 
regulatory environment (especially land use policies and building regulations), but also due to 
the structure of the construction sector (including the material inputs into the construction 
process).  In contrast, housing demand within and across countries is relatively predictable as it 
varies with income level.  For a given income level, the availability of mortgage finance (and the 
prevailing interest rates) plays an important role.  Mortgage finance is a critical factor in 
generating housing demand, yet in many countries it is severely limited.  In the context of the 
overall housing market—in which factors that influence supply and demand interact to affect 
housing outcomes—we focus on mortgage finance as an important, binding constraint on the 
demand side.
5,6   
Second, our emphasis on market solutions means that our work is not immediately 
relevant to those in an economy’s lowest income levels. Historically, for those who do not have 
                                                      
5 The complexity of the housing market system dictates that each of the other aspects of housing supply and housing 
demand is worthy of a complete and separate study. 
6 Certainly, housing finance also impacts the supply side through its impact on builders and developers. 
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 the requisite financial resources, it has been the government’s role to provide housing—be it 
rental property or for owner occupation.  While we do not dispute that there is an important role 
for government housing to serve the poorest sectors of the population, there are limitations such 
as fiscal pressures and, in many countries, the burden of long-term liabilities.  Moreover, in 
many places government-provided housing is inadequate, potentially leading to other problems. 
As there is a view that the role of government has switched from that of a provider to more of a 
market enabler, to the extent that our study—by focusing on the basic fundamental factors 
necessary to enable housing finance—helps lay the groundwork for financial sector innovation 
and development, it will be relevant for even the poorest sectors. We also note that our study is 
of collateralized housing loans, so the work of housing microfinance institutions (HMFIs) is 
necessarily excluded. HMFIs have been providing non-collateralized loans to increase the home 
purchase possibilities for low income households.
7 Our emerging market results should apply to 
housing micro loans (HMLs)—that is, better credit information systems should improve the 
depth of the HML market—with the caveat that currently credit information systems are less 
informative for the lowest income segments. Finally, we recognize that ownership is not the 
answer for all.  But it is often preferred to renting regardless of income level in part because of 
the asset properties of a home, and even affordable rental units require financing for their initial 
construction.  
We strive in this paper to focus on basic underlying factors that can be addressed by 
policy and government programs to improve the reach of national housing finance systems.  To 
make our analysis more concrete, we note one simple example.  As we will show in Section 3, 
the Philippines lags behind many of its Asian peers in the provision of housing finance, while 
                                                      
7 See HGSD Center for Urban Development Studies (2000) for case studies, Ferguson (2004) for an overview, 
Daphnis and Ferguson (2004) for a collection of studies, and FinMark (2006) for an application in South Africa. 
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 Malaysia has the preeminent housing finance system in the region.  Our regression results 
indicate that legislation currently under consideration in the Philippine Congress—the Credit 
Information System Act (which would create a central credit information bureau in a country that 
currently has very limited consumer credit information) and the Corporate Recovery Act (which 
would revamp outdated bankruptcy laws)—could potentially lay the groundwork for closing 
much of the gap in housing finance between the Philippines and Malaysia. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we lay out a framework that 
highlights the underlying factors that enable (or impede) the development of housing finance 
systems.  Section 3 presents our main empirical results on the determinants of the size of housing 
finance systems across 61 countries.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Housing Finance System 
  We can view the housing finance sector in terms of supply and demand. Demand for 
housing finance is in a sense a derived demand that flows from the demand for housing, which in 
turn depends importantly on the rate of household formation and income levels.  In addition, 
with housing costs typically being a multiple of annual income, housing is made affordable by 
spreading payments over time, so adequate housing finance must be longer term in nature.   
On the supply side, one way to think about the provision of housing finance is to split it 
into two components: (i) the provision of housing finance by a lender who has ample funds at 
hand, and (ii) the mobilization of funds within an economy so that lending institutions have 
access to funds. 
For lenders with adequate funds to choose to allocate some portion to long-term housing 
finance, a number of preconditions should be in place: 
  5
 •  Information on the Borrower. To adequately price a loan, a lender must have information on 
the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers that enables the determination of the 
probability of default.  The information could be produced by a standardized and accurate 
source of credit history—such as public credit registries or private credit bureaus.  Best is if 
the source has a wide coverage of the population, and the most informative source would 
include negative as well as positive transactions. Absent standardized information of credit 
histories, standard banking relationships, in which a bank spends considerable resources 
acquiring information on potential borrowers, would work but would limit (at least 
geographically, if not in other ways) the loan-creation capabilities of the lenders and of the 
housing finance system as a whole.  
•  Ability to Value the Property.  There should be an ability to determine the market value of the 
property. This is a natural outcome of a well-functioning housing market in which detailed 
information on housing transactions is maintained in a systematic way.  For example, if data 
on the sales price and relevant features of the home (location, size, age, etc.) are maintained 
in a mandatory property registry, appraisers can more accurately value prospective homes for 
the lenders and borrowers.
8  
•  Ability to Secure Collateral. The lender should to be able to secure collateral against the loan 
in case of default.  The house itself is an obvious candidate for that collateral, providing that 
in the case of default the lender can seize the property.  To seize the property requires that 
there is something resembling clear title and that the legal system allows the lender to seize 
collateral.   
                                                      
8 The property registry and appraisal system will also enhance the efficiency of the overall housing market, as 
consumers will have better information to judge the relative value of various properties. 
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 •  Macroeconomic Stability. The macroeconomic environment should be stable.  If inflation is 
volatile, the lender would incur substantial interest rate risk if it lends at a fixed rate.  In an 
unstable environment, lenders will typically pass on this risk to the borrowers—who are less 
likely to fully understand it—by only offering floating rate loans.  Substantial interest rate 
risk, no matter who bears it, will retard the development of the housing finance system, as 
either lenders will go out of business (e.g., U.S. savings and loans in the 1980s) or borrowers 
will be unable to repay their loans (or both). 
 
If the conditions for long-term lending are in place, lenders must have ample access to 
funds in order to lend.  
•  Sources of Funds. In the primary market, deposit-taking institutions, such as banks, can fund 
mortgages through deposits. However, because deposits are short term, if this is the only 
source of funds housing loans will tend to be short term or at variable rates.
9  Short-term 
loans, given that housing is expensive, are unattractive to potential borrowers. Potential 
borrowers might find variable rate loans attractive, but will likely not be able to gauge the 
substantial interest rate risk they are bearing (BIS 2006a).  In addition, a reliance on deposits 
implies that funding sources are limited geographically, which increases risk. An important 
additional source of funds for the housing finance system is the secondary market, which 
buys the loans from the primary market and finds many ways to mobilize funds.
10  One set of 
participants in the secondary market is mortgage securitizers, who bundle and repackage 
mortgages (or parts of mortgages) to create new securities, and investors in these mortgage 
                                                      
9 More generally, a well developed housing finance system will typically have a diversity of lenders in the primary 
market (such as nondepository mortgage specialists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), and contractual savings systems) and greater specialization within the origination process. See 
Follain and Zorn (2000) on the unbundling of the mortgage finance business. 
10 The development of Fannie Mae, for example, in the U.S. stemmed from illiquid or draining resources. 
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 securities.  The securitizers can be public (such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae) 
or private (such as GE Capital); the investors can be domestic or foreign institutions or 
individuals; and, in general, the secondary market for mortgages can be an important part of 
a country’s broader capital markets. 
•  Additional Sources of Liquidity. Whatever the usual sources of funds, it is important to have 
a backstop, such as a governmental liquidity window, in case of temporary liquidity 
crunches.  
 
In summary, a basic infrastructure that can enable a well-functioning housing finance 
system includes factors that promote long-term lending (the ability to value property and to seize 
it in the case of default, information on the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, 
macroeconomic stability) and factors that promote the mobilization of funds (be it through 
savings and deposits, capital markets, a governmental liquidity window, or secondary markets).
11
 
3. Scope of Housing Finance Systems 
Potential Measures 
The efficacy of housing finance systems can be measured along many dimensions.  One 
measure would be the portion of households that has access to housing finance products.
12  An 
important determinant of access so defined is the range of financing products that is available.  
Such products can range from interest-only loans, option ARMs, and negative amortization loans 
                                                      
11 These factors can also be recast in terms of risk mitigation (Van Order, 2005). 
12  Typically the lowest income households in any country are served (if at all) by government subsidies.  In many 
developing countries, a large portion of the population might have income levels that are too low to afford any type 
of formal housing.  While other problems in the housing system might dominate, housing finance can help or 
worsen the situation. (See page 5 of Hoek-Smit and Diamond, 2003, for more on this). This is not to say that 
housing finance cannot extend to the bottom of the pyramid. It can, but requires innovative products; see Melzer 
(2006) for a discussion specific to South Africa. 
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 that are currently offered in some developed countries to the Mexican conglomerate CEMEX’s 
products Patrimonio Hoy (enabling incremental additions to housing) or Construmex (which taps 
remittances).
13   
Table 1, which presents partial information on features of typical mortgages in a range of 
countries, shows that across countries mortgages vary in their typical length, loan-to-value ratios, 
and whether they tend to be at fixed or adjustable rates.  Very few emerging economies—
Malaysia, Thailand and some transition economies in Eastern Europe—have typical maturities of 
30 years.  Another, non-overlapping subset of emerging economies tends to have fixed-rate 
mortgages.  Thus, no emerging market appears to have widespread availability of long-term 
fixed rate mortgages. In developed countries, many have mortgages with terms of 25 years or 
greater, and roughly half have predominantly fixed rate products.
14
A somewhat blunter measure of depth is the sheer size of the housing finance market.  All 
else equal, larger housing finance markets likely reach a greater proportion of the population. 
Size is not a perfect indicator of efficacy, though, as it is also influenced by price dynamics and 
tax considerations. For example, a housing bubble requires, all else equal, a larger housing 
finance market and tax treatments in countries such as Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.S. 
tend to result in a larger stock of mortgage debt. But size has one important advantage: We can 
construct it for a wide range of countries. 
 
                                                      
13 See BIS (2006a) for a description of recent innovations in housing finance products in industrial countries. On 
CEMEX’s products, see “CEMEX: Innovation in Housing for the Poor” in Prahalad (2004) or www.cemex.com. 
14 The data in Table 1 are not complete or reliable enough to be included in our empirical analysis. We note that in 
any economy it is not clear a priori whether the prevalence of fixed or variable rate mortgages owes to lender or 
borrower preferences. 
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 Cross-Country Data on the Size of the Housing Finance System 
In this section we present data on the size of housing finance markets across a wide range 
of countries.  There is no single source for these data, so we pool together data from different 
sources.  As there is yet to be a standardized methodology for collecting data on housing finance, 
we cannot vouch for the quality of the data. Moreover, the data are not always collected at the 
same time, so we will focus on two measures: the annual average from 2001 to 2005 of any data 
we have for a particular country and the maximum value over that time period.  In all cases, to 
compare across countries we scale the size of the housing finance sector by nominal GDP. 
We gather data from a wide range of sources. Stephens (2003) and Low et al. (2003) 
provide information on Western European countries.  IMF (2004) has data on Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and the United States.  Zhu (2006) and Ong (2005) contain 2005 data for a 
handful of emerging Asian countries. BIS (2006a) has data for selected countries for 1994 and 
2004. Renaud (2005) contains data on many emerging economies, as does World Bank (2005).  
IMF (2006) provides 2005 data for 30 countries.
15   
Bringing together all of these sources, and using them (and others) to cross-check 
wherever possible, we are able to compile data on mortgage debt outstanding for 62 countries 
for at least one year during the 2001 to 2005 period. Because we have data for selected years 
that vary by country, we construct two measures.  The first, MD/GDP (avg), is the average 
mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio for the 2001-2005 period.  The second, MD/GDP (max), is the 
maximum mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio for the 2001-2005 period.  Throughout, because our 
                                                      
15 The IMF (2006) data underlie its Figures 2.1 and 2.7.  We thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti for providing us with 
the underlying data. 
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 empirical results do not hinge on which measure we use, we will refer to only MD/GDP (max) 
in our discussion.
16
Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 provide information on the size of housing finance systems 
(as a share of GDP) for 62 countries.  Emerging market economies generally have far smaller 
housing finance systems than developed countries.  Among the 38 emerging economies in our 
sample, housing finance averages 10 percent of GDP, with the largest housing finance systems 
being between 20 and 30 percent of GDP (Malaysia, Taiwan, Korea, South Africa, Estonia, and 
Israel).
17  In contrast, housing finance in the 24 developed countries in our sample averages 55 
percent of GDP, with almost all systems exceeding 40 percent.   
Figure 2 highlights the considerable variation of housing finance across countries, even 
those within the same region.  Why is Latvia’s market 14 percent of GDP but Romania’s only 
1.8 percent? Why is the Philippines’ market 12 percent but Malaysia’s 31.5 percent?  Even 
among developed countries there is great variation.  In the next section we attempt to 
disentangle the root causes for the variation in the size of housing finance systems across 
countries. 
 
Main Explanatory Variables 
We aim to explain why some countries have larger housing finance systems than others. 
The framework discussed in Section 2 guides the empirical analysis in this section.  Two 
                                                      
16 Across countries, the correlation between the two measures is 0.995. 
17  South Africa is an example where depth does not translate into access. While it has a deep mortgage market by 
emerging market standards, roughly one-quarter of its households do not have access to housing finance (Melzer, 
2006). 
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 important explanatory variables, Legal Rights and Credit Info, come from the Getting Credit 
section of the World Bank’s Doing Business reports.
18
We noted above that for a mortgage lender to be comfortable lending long-term, it needs 
to be able to secure collateral against the loan in case of default, and this ability hinges on being 
able to seize the collateral (the property) in the case of default.  To capture this ability we utilize 
Legal Rights, an index of the strength of legal rights. Legal Rights is composed of ten categories, 
seven of which pertain to collateral law and three pertain to bankruptcy law:  
•  general rather than specific description of assets is permitted in collateral agreements; 
•  general rather than specific description of debt is permitted in collateral agreements; 
•  any legal or natural person may grant or take security in the property;  
•  a unified registry operates that includes charges over movable property;  
•  secured creditors have priority outside of bankruptcy; 
•  secured creditors, rather than other parties such as government or workers, are paid first 
out of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm; 
•  secured creditors are able to seize their collateral when a debtor enters reorganization, 
with no “automatic stay” or “asset freeze” imposed by the court; 
•  management does not stay during reorganization, and an administrator is responsible for 
managing the business during reorganization;  
•  parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract; and  
•  creditors may both seize and sell collateral out of court without restriction. 
                                                      
18 See www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/GettingCredit.aspx for a complete description of the Getting 
Business portion of the Doing Business database. For both Legal Rights and Credit Info, we utilize annual averages 
through 2005. Data on the underlying components of each measure are available only for the current year (2006), so 
we utilize the aggregate measures. Similar variables, but in the form of zero-one dummy variables, are used in 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006). 
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 A score of 1 is assigned if each feature is present in the country, so that the Legal Rights index 
ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better 
designed to expand access to credit. 
The framework in Section 2 also highlighted the importance of lenders’ access to 
standardized and informative sources of credit information on potential borrowers.  For this our 
main variable is Credit Info, an index of the depth of credit information, which ranges from 0 to 
6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information.  One point is added 
for each of the following six features of the credit information system:  
•  both positive (for example, amount of loan and on-time repayment pattern) and negative 
(for instance, number and amount of defaults, late payments, bankruptcies) credit 
information is distributed;  
•  data on both firms and individuals are distributed;  
•  data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial institutions are 
distributed;  
•  more than 2 years of historical data are distributed;  
•  data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed; and  
•  by law, borrowers have the right to access their data. 
 
Finally, we noted that in volatile macroeconomic environments substantial interest rate 
risk can impede lending; we proxy for this volatility with Inflation Vol, the standard deviation of 
quarterly CPI inflation rates (collected from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics data 
base) over the period 1995 to 2004.  As a control, we include Country Size, the log of the 2001-
  13




Main Empirical Results 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the whole sample as well as the emerging and 
developed markets groupings.  Developed countries score, on average, better than emerging 
economies in the outcomes (size of the housing finance system) and along most (but not all) 
dimensions of the underlying factors.  In particular, emerging economies lag (on average) in 
legal rights, credit information, and macroeconomic stability.  Looking at the range of the 
underlying factors, the range of legal rights seen in emerging economies roughly mirrors those in 
developed countries.  The depth of credit information in developed countries is almost uniformly 
high (the lowest score is 4 out of 6), whereas in emerging economies there is wide dispersion in 
the quality of credit information. 
Table 4 shows the main regression results.  In the full sample, even after controlling for 
country size (which is highly significant), countries with stronger legal rights, better provision of 
credit information, and a less volatile macroeconomic environment have larger housing finance 
systems.  In the emerging economies and developed countries samples, Country Size is no longer 
significant; within the sets of emerging economies and developed countries, larger countries do 
not (all else equal) have larger housing finance systems.  Legal Rights is highly significant for 
developed countries, but less so for emerging economies, where it is marginally significant in 
some specifications and insignificant in others.  In contrast, macroeconomic stability and the 
                                                      
19 We supplemented this source with data on Luxembourg and Estonia from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. We follow Djankov et al. (2006) in using as a control variable country size, which can be argued to be 
exogenous, rather than per capita income, which is influenced by financial sector development (Levine 1997; 
Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). 
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 strength of credit information systems matter in emerging economies but not in developed 
countries.
20,21
To bring the empirical results to life, we next highlight some of the differences across 
countries.  In general, emerging economies lag far behind developed countries in the provision of 
housing finance.  The full sample results in Table 4 suggest that this is explained by a number of 
reasons.  First, emerging economies tend to be smaller, poorer, and have more volatile inflation.  
Small and poor might be difficult to change rapidly, but many emerging economies have taken 
steps to limit the macroeconomic volatility that stems from economic policy (e.g., by 
implementing a policy of inflation targeting).  On the legal rights index, emerging economies 
lag, on average, by two full points, although some have legal rights as strong as the best 
developed countries.  On the depth of credit information, the emerging market average is below 
the minimum level found in developed countries.  The point estimates in column (1) of Table 4 
suggests that bringing their legal rights and credit information systems up to the developed 
country average would enable almost a 20 percentage point (of GDP) increase in the size of 
emerging economies’ housing finance systems.  This would close the gap between housing 
finance in developed and emerging economies by almost half. 
Turning to particular countries, the Philippines, with housing finance totaling about 12 
percent of GDP, is on par with many Latin American countries and about at the emerging 
economy average, but it lags behind many of its Asian peers. Comparing it to Malaysia—with 
                                                      
20 We also constructed variables based on two other Doing Business information variables, Public Registry and 
Credit Bureau (the percentage of individuals or firms listed in a public credit registry or private credit bureau) with 
current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding.  Neither are informative, nor do they 
change our results in any way. 
21 Another potential scaling factor is overall private credit in the economy, as presented in Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer (2006). Scaling housing finance by private credit would not change our main results. Countries with 
stronger legal rights and deeper credit information systems have larger housing finance systems (as a share of 
overall private credit), with information being relatively more important within the set of emerging market countries 
and legal rights explaining differences among developed countries. 
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 housing finance at 32 percent of GDP—shows why.
22 The Philippines scores a 3 on both legal 
rights and credit information (it basically has no credit bureau to speak of), compared to an 8 and 
a 6 for Malaysia.  If the Philippines moved to Malaysian standards on legal rights and credit 
information, the point estimates in column (5) of Table 4 suggest that it could add almost 14 
percentage points (of GDP) to its housing finance sector.  To put this another way, two bills 
currently under review by the Philippine Congress—the Credit Information System Act 
(providing for the creation of a central credit information bureau) and the Corporate Recovery 
Act (to modernize the obsolete corporate rehabilitation law)—could begin the process of moving 
the Philippines up to Malaysian standards.
23
 
Further Analysis of Emerging Markets 
  In this subsection we further examine the determinants of the depth of emerging markets’ 
housing finance systems. There are many potential factors, but data limitations preclude most 
from inclusion in our study. For example, a potential driver of mortgage finance development is 
the enabling force of government-supported housing finance agencies; see, for example, Chan, 
Davies, and Gyntelberg (2006). However, we have not been able to gather data on the existence 
of such agencies across a substantial portion of the 38 emerging market countries in our sample.  
Another potentially important enabling factor is the existence of well-developed 
government securities markets. To test this we construct a variable, Govt Mkt, from many 
sources.
24 In all cases Govt Mkt is the average (computed over, where available, 1996-2001) ratio 
                                                      
22 There is also a great disparity in housing outcomes between the two countries. For example, in the Philippines 44 
percent of the urban population live in slums, whereas in Malaysia the corresponding figure is only 2 percent (UN-
Habitat, 2005). 
23 For more on the issues impeding financial market development (particularly corporate bond market development) 
in the Philippines, see Espenilla (2006). 
24 The main source is data underlying BIS Quarterly Review Table 16A on outstanding domestic debt. We thank 
Thomas Jans of BIS for providing the portion of Table 16A coinciding with government (as opposed to private) 
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 of government securities outstanding to GDP.  Table 5 shows, however, that the size of emerging 
markets’ government securities markets is not related to the depth of the housing finance 
system.
25 The insignificance of government securities markets could owe to high correlation with 
other explanatory variables. For example, country size and creditor friendly macroeconomic 
policies that produce lower inflation volatility is strongly associated with the size of government 
securities markets (Burger and Warnock, 2006; Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler, 
forthcoming; Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006). However, removing country size and 
inflation volatility does not impact the result. We also constructed, but do not report, regressions 
that were designed to ascertain whether the countries with the smallest government securities 
markets tended to have smaller housing finance systems.
26 Our results show that they do not. 
Overall, it seems clear that government securities markets do not provide an additional impetus 
to the development of the housing finance system above and beyond what is already provided by 
deep credit information systems, strong legal rights, and low inflation (which owe in part to 
creditor friendly macroeconomic policies). 
 
4. Conclusion 
  In this paper we provided a picture of the extent of housing finance in 61 countries and 
presented a framework for analyzing housing finance systems.  Our empirical analysis showed 
that across all countries, those with stronger legal rights for borrowers and lenders (through 
collateral and bankruptcy laws), deeper credit information systems, and a more stable 
                                                                                                                                                                           
issuance. We increase the coverage by using IMF Country Reports 04/31, 03/194, 03/258, 02/179, 03/134, 04/173, 
03/112, 03/163, 01/116, and 03/109. For 6 countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Iran, Kazakstan, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia) 
we were not able to find evidence of a government bond market and so assume zero; our results are not significantly 
affected if we omit those 6 countries. 
25 For completeness, Table 5 also reports results for the full and developed country samples. 
26 Specifically, we created three dummies that capture whether a country’s government bond market was small, 
medium, or large (i.e., in the first, second, or third tercile) and included them in our models from Table 5 (omitting 
the constant). Statistically, one cannot reject that the coefficients on the three dummies are identical. 
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 macroeconomic environment have deeper housing finance systems.  These same factors also 
help explain the variation in housing finance across emerging economies. Across developed 
countries, which tend to have low macroeconomic volatility and relatively extensive credit 
information systems, variation in the strength of legal rights helps explain the extent of housing 
finance. 
Our results will not surprise experts in housing finance.  For example, a decade ago 
Gallardo (1998, page 216) wrote: “Rationalizing the legal framework; improving loan 
information, underlying, and asset quality; and redefining the role of government in the primary 
market will be crucial to improving the management of risk and transaction costs in the housing 
finance market and priming that market to become an integral part of the capital markets.” Our 
study shows that across a wide range of countries, the basic underlying factors that any housing 
finance expert would list as necessary preconditions for a well-developed housing finance system 
do indeed help to explain variations in development levels.   
  In many emerging market economies, the time is ripe for further development of the 
capital markets that will foster the provision of housing finance.  On the supply side, bond 
market development is proceeding, and the conditions for its further development are well 
understood.  Domestic institutions with long-dated liabilities naturally have demand for long-
dated assets. Increased supply of and demand for long-dated assets can spur the emergence of 
derivatives that enable investors to offload risk to those interested in bearing it, further increasing 
the supply of capital. Our work suggests that if, alongside these potentially positive 
developments in the availability of long-term finance, countries also take the steps necessary to 
foster housing finance (strengthening legal rights and deepening credit information systems), a 
meaningful expansion in the provision of housing finance is quite possible. 
  18
 It should be noted that while the unit of study in this paper is the country, we fully 
recognize that there can be considerable variation in housing finance systems within countries.  
For example, of the twelve million households in South Africa, roughly three million do not 
currently qualify for any sort of traditional mortgage product (FinMark 2006, Melzer 2006).  
Even within the well-developed U.S. housing finance system, great disparities in access persist.  
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 Table 1. Characteristics of Mortgage Products 
 
   Typical length of contract, 
years 




Mostly Fixed or 
Variable? 
Emerging Market Economies         
  Africa         
 Algeria  Max  30    90   
 Ghana  Max  20-25    80   
 Morrocco  Max  25    70-100   
 South  Africa  10-20       
 Tunisia         
  Eastern Europe        
 Bulgaria         
  Croatia  up to 20 or 30      Fixed/Variable 
  Czech Republic  Less than 20  30-50  100  Fixed (Mixed) 
 Estonia        Variable 
 Hungary  5-35    70  Variable  (Mixed) 
 Kazakhstan  3-20    70  Variable 
 Latvia         
 Poland  5-32.5    100  Variable 
 Romania  10-20      Variable 
 Russia  10-15      Fixed/Variable 
 Slovakia         
 Slovenia  10  50    Variable 
  Emerging Asia        
  Bangladesh  less than 15  50-70     
  China  10-15 typical; max 30    80  Variable 
 India  max  20    85  Mixed 
  Indonesia  8, 10, or 15 (max 20)  75-80  90  Variable 
  Korea  typical 3; max 20  56  70  Variable 
 Malaysia  Max  30    80  Variable 
 Pakistan         
 Philippines  Max  20-30  70-80     
 Taiwan         
  Thailand  typical 10-20; max 30  70-80  90-100  Variable 
  Latin America        
  Argentina  12-20 (max 20)  80-90     
 Bolivia         
 Brazil  Max  20    75-100  Variable 
 Chile  8-20    75   
 Colombia  Max  30    70   
 Costa  Rica         
 Ecuador         
 Guatamala         
  Honduras  20 typical; 30 max    70  Variable 
 Mexico  10-15  80-90  100  (payroll)   
 Panama         
 Paraguay         
 Peru         
 Uruguay  Max  25    70   
 Venezuela  Max  20    70-75   
  Middle East        
 Iran  Max  18    70-80   
 Israel         
 Jordan  max  20  80-90     
 Saudi  Arabia         
 Turkey  10    75-80   
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 Table 1. Characteristics of Mortgage Products (continued) 
 
  
Typical length of contract, 
years 
Estimated  
Average LTV  Max LTV  Mostly Fixed or 
Variable? 
Developed Countries        
  Europe        
 Austria  25  60    Fixed 
 Belgium  20  80-85  100  Fixed 
 Denmark  30  max  80  80  Fixed 
 Finland  15-20  (variable)  75-80    Variable 
  France 15-20  78  100  Fixed? 
  Germany  20-30 w. initial fix of 5-10  67  80  Fixed? 
 Greece  15  55    Variable 
 Ireland  20  80  100+  Variable 
 Italy  5-20  55  80  Variable  (Mixed) 
 Luxembourg  20-25  80    Variable 
 Netherlands  30  87  125  Fixed 
 Norway         
 Portugal  25-30  83  90  Variable 
 Spain  15-20  70  100  Variable 
 Sweden  30-45  years  80-95    Variable 
 Switzerland  15-20    80   
 UK  25  69  110  Variable 
  North America        
  Canada  25  60  75 or 95 (w/ins)  Fixed/Variable 
 US  30  76    Fixed 
  Pacific        
 Australia  25  60-70  90-100  Variable 
 Hong  Kong  15    70   
 Japan  20-30  70-80    Fixed  (Mixed) 
 New  Zealand         
 Singapore  30-35    80  Variable 
 
Sources: Scanlon and Whitehead (2004), Calhoun (2005), Hoek-Smit (2005), Zhu (2006), Low et al. (2003), Ong 
(2006), Hegedüs and Struyk (2005), BIS (2006a), Brounen, Neuteboom, and van Dijkhuizen (2006), Green and 
Wachter (2005), Tiwari and Moriizumi (2003), National Association of Realtors (2000a, 2000b), IMF (2006), and 
Sheppard (2007).  
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 Table 2. The Depth of Housing Finance 









Emerging Market Economies   10.2   Developed Countries   54.8 
  Africa     15.7    North  America   67.7 
   DZA  Algeria  1.3 1.5      CAN  Canada  42.9  43.0 
   GHA  Ghana  0.5 0.5      USA  US  67.4  69.4 
   MAR  Morrocco  7.0 7.0    Pacific     40.2 
   ZAF  South  Africa  22.0 26.1      AUS  Australia  61.9  71.0 
   TUN  Tunisia  6.0 6.0      HKG  Hong  Kong  41.5  44.0 
 Eastern  Europe   3.9       JPN  Japan  35.7  36.4 
   BGR  Bulgaria  4.7 4.7      NZL  New  Zealand  78.2  78.2 
   HRV  Croatia  10.0 10.0      SGP  Singapore  60.2  61.3 
   CZE  Czech  Rep.  4.6 5.5    Europe     48.3 
   EST  Estonia  22.0 22.0      AUT  Austria  26.1  26.1
   HUN  Hungary  8.6 11.0      BEL  Belgium  27.7  28.3
   LVA  Latvia  12.1 14.0      DNK  Denmark  79.0  87.9
   POL  Poland  4.4 5.2      FIN  Finland  32.4  35.7
   ROM  Romania  1.8 1.8      FRA  France  24.1  29.0
   RUS  Russia  0.5 0.6      DEU  Germany  47.4  54.0
   SVK  Slovakia  4.9 5.9      GRC  Greece  14.8  17.6
   SVN  Slovenia  3.5 3.5      IRL  Ireland  45.4  59.2
  Emerging Asia   14.3       ITA  Italy  13.1  15.0
   BGD  Bangladesh  2.5 2.5      LUX  Luxembourg  32.3  33.5
   CHN  China  10.0 12.0      NLD  Netherlands  82.7  100.0
   IND  India  4.9 5.8      NOR  Norway  45.0  45.0
   IDN  Indonesia  2.1 2.1      PRT  Portugal  48.9  50.7
   KOR  Korea  20.8 25.0      ESP  Spain  36.3  40.2
   MYS  Malaysia  28.3 31.5      SWE  Sweden  50.2  50.3
   PAK  Pakistan  0.7 0.7      CHE  Switzerland  130.0  130.0
   PHL  Philippines  6.8 12.0      GBR  UK  61.5  64.0
   TWN  Taiwan  26.0 26.0             
   THA  Thailand  15.5 16.0             
  Latin America   6.8               
   ARG  Argentina  1.7 1.7             
   BOL  Bolivia  9.5 9.5             
   BRA  Brazil  2.6 5.0             
   CHL  Chile  14.8 16.0             
   COL  Colombia  10.0 12.0             
   MEX  Mexico  9.8 11.0             
   PER  Peru  2.2 2.5             
   VEN  Venezuela  0.7 0.7             
  Middle East   5.6               
   IRN  Iran  2.8 3.0             
   ISR  Israel  22.0 22.0             
   SAU  Saudi  Arabia  1.0 1.0             
   TUR  Turkey  2.5 2.5             
 
Notes. The table presents data on mortgage debt outstanding expressed as a share of nominal GDP. All data are for the 2001 to 
2005 period, but not all years are available for all countries. MD/GDP (avg) and MD/GDP (max) are the average and maximum 
mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios (expressed as a percentage) for the 2001-2005 period. See text for sources. 
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 Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
 N  Mean  Stdev  Min  Max 
All Countries       
MD/GDP (avg)  61  23.5  26.8  0.3  130 
MD/GDP (max)  61  25.5  28.4  0.5  130 
Legal Rights  61  5.2  2.2  2  10 
Credit Info  61  3.9  1.8  0  6 
Inflation Vol  61  15.4  52.6  .5  391 
Country  Size  61 25.6  1.5 22.6 29.9 
Developed Markets       
MD/GDP (avg)  23  50.2  26.1  13  130 
MD/GDP (max)  23 53.8 27.3  15  130 
Legal Rights  23 6.5 2.1  3  10 
Credit Info  23 4.9 1.0  3  6 
Inflation Vol  23 1.3 1.2 0.5  29.9 
Country Size  23 26.6 1.3  24.7  29.9 
Emerging Market 
Economies 
     
MD/GDP  (avg)  38 7.4 7.4 0.3  28 
MD/GDP (max)  38 8.4 8.1 0.5  31.5 
Legal Rights  38 4.5 1.9  2  9 
Credit Info  38 3.3 1.9  0  6 
Inflation Vol  38  24.0  65.5  1.3  391 
Country  Size  38 24.9  1.3 22.6 27.7 
 
MD/GDP (avg) and MD/GDP (max) are the average and maximum mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios (expressed as a 
percentage) for the 2001-2005 period.  Inflation Vol is the standard deviation of quarterly CPI inflation rates over the 
period 1995 to 2004. Country Size is the log of the 2001-2003 average of gross national income (in current U.S. 
dollars), as reported in Djankov et al. (2006) (with EST added from WDI). The rest of the variables are from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business reports.  Legal Rights is the 2004-2005 average of the index of the strength of legal 
rights; each year it ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better 
designed to expand access to credit.  Credit Info is the 2003-2005 average of the index of the depth of credit 
information; each year it ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information, from either a public registry or a private bureau.  In this and all subsequent tables, the maximum 




 Table 4. Main Regression Results 
 
The dependent variables are MD/GDP (max), the maximum mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio for the 2001-2005 period, 
in the first two columns of each panel, and MD/GDP (avg), the average mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio for the 2001-
2005 period, in the last two columns of each panel; each is expressed as a percentage.  Legal Rights is the 2004-2005 
average of the index of the strength of legal rights; each year it ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating 
that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit.  Credit Info is the 2003-2005 
average of the index of the depth of credit information; each year it ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating 
the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau.  Inflation Vol is the 
standard deviation of quarterly CPI inflation rates over the period 1995 to 2004.  Country Size is the log of the 2001-
2003 average of gross national income (in current U.S. dollars).  Constants are included but not reported. The 
absolute values of t-statistics computed using robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, 





  All Countries  Emerging Market 
Economies 
Developed Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        







  (6.12) (6.16) (2.36) (2.26) (4.42) (4.60) 
        




a -2.39 -1.96 
  (2.81) (2.76) (3.32) (3.28) (0.54) (0.47) 
        




b -6.32 -5.36 
  (2.28) (2.15) (2.27) (2.10) (1.15) (0.96) 
        
Country Size  4.96
a 4.61
a 0.47 0.17 -2.41  -2.07 
  (3.82) (3.70) (0.46) (0.17) (0.60) (0.63) 
        
        
N  61 61 38 38 23 23 
Adj. R
2 0.460 0.451 0.319 0.316 0.146 0.114 
 
  28
 Table 5. Additional Regression Results 
 
The dependent variables are MD/GDP (max), the maximum mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio for the 2001-2005 period, 
in the first two columns of each panel, and MD/GDP (avg), the average mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio for the 2001-
2005 period, in the last two columns of each panel; each is expressed as a percentage.  Legal Rights is the 2004-2005 
average of the index of the strength of legal rights; each year it ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating 
that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit.  Credit Info is the 2003-2005 
average of the index of the depth of credit information; each year it ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating 
the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau.  Inflation Vol is the 
standard deviation of quarterly CPI inflation rates over the period 1995 to 2004.  Country Size is the log of the 2001-
2003 average of gross national income (in current U.S. dollars).  Govt Mkt is the 1996-2001 average of the size of 
government securities markets (expressed as a share of GDP).  Constants are included but not reported.  The 
absolute values of t-statistics computed using robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, 





  All Countries  Emerging Market 
Economies 
Developed Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        







  (6.24) (6.24) (2.27) (2.22) (1.94) (1.82) 
        




a -1.64 -1.16 
  (2.30) (2.26) (3.04) (3.00) (0.29) (0.21) 
        




c -6.19 -5.22 
  (1.99) (1.86) (1.81) (1.80) (1.07) (0.89) 
        
Country Size  4.14
a 3.90
a 0.40 0.14 -1.70  -1.30 
  (2.93) (2.83) (0.38) (0.14) (0.68) (0.31) 
        
Govt  Mkt  0.16 0.14 0.05 0.02 -0.24  -0.26 
  (1.36) (1.29) (0.50) (0.18) (0.80) (0.84) 
        
N  61 61 38 38 23 23 
Adj. R
2 0.464 0.452 0.304 0.296 0.132 0.108 
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Figure 1. The Depth of Mortgage Markets: Regional Aggregates 
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 Figure 2. The Depth of Mortgage Markets: Individual Countries  
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The Depth of Mortgage Markets: Europe
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